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DAMAGE LIMITATIONS IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS:
NECESSARY LEGISLATION OR
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION?

"This is a world ofcompensations; and he who would be

no slave must consent to have no slave. Those who deny
freedom to others deserve it not for themselves, and,
under a just God, cannot long retain it."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

While the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether
damage limitations in medical malpractice actions violate any federal
constitutional provisions, many state courts have been faced with this difficult
question.' The problem of calculating the loss of a physical attribute or ability
due to the mistake of a trusted physician is inherently difficult, and calculating
compensation for noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering is even
harder. This decision was traditionally left to twelve individuals who had been
assaulted by opposing sides with charts, tables, estimations, and hypotheticals.
This has resulted in both grossly under-compensated victims as well as awards
that have fostered the creation of the nouveau riche. It is the latter of these
results that has caught the eyes of lawmakers across the country. Numerous
state legislatures have enacted statutes which limit the maximum amount of
damages that can be awarded to plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions or
have capped the amount of noneconomic damages that plaintiffs may recover.
States that have not yet enacted such legislation are lobbied continuously for
similar initiatives. South Carolina has not yet enacted any such damage
limitations and this Comment argues that inaction is the best course of action.
In addition to state controls, Congress is considering several bills that would

1. Letter from Abraham Lincoln, to H.L. Pierce and others (April 6, 1859) reprinted in
JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 448 (Justin Kaplan ed., Little, Brown and Co. 1992)
(emphasis added). While Lincoln was obviously addressing more prominent social problems of
the times, his words are metaphorically relevant to the topic. His words are also somewhat ironic
in that Lincoln was a prominent medical malpractice attorney during the first medical malpractice
crisis in the United States. See generally ALLEN D. SPIEGEL, A. LINCOLN, ESQUIRE: A SHREWD,
SOPHISTICATED LAWYER INHIS TIME (Mercer Univ. Press 2002).
2. The United States Supreme Court has not heard a case that challenges a state's damage
limitation statute, and currently no federal law limits damages, although several bills were
considered in the 2002 congressional session and several bills are currently pending in the 2003
session. See infra note 13.
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substantially limit the amount of damages medical malpractice victims are able
to recover.
Why has this issue drawn so much attention from lawmakers? The
perceived problem is that excessive damage recoveries by some malpractice
victims are driving up the cost of medical malpractice insurance coverage to
which any pragmatic physician is sure to subscribe and is legally obligated to
maintain. Physicians complain about increasing premiums, and now some
lawmakers are convinced that the cost is so high that many doctors cannot pay
these premiums and subsequently cannot practice medicine. Lawmakers
perceive this to be a public threat in that there will not be sufficient access to
healthcare if there are not enough licensed and insured health care providers.
The result has been that some states have enacted legislation to cap medical
malpractice damages.
Part II of this Comment provides the background of the debate surrounding
damage caps. In part, this section focuses on one state's comprehensive reform
scheme and the judicial challenges to it, as well as highlighting legislation
pending before Congress. Part III analyzes the constitutional problems as well
as the practical effects of damage limitation reforms. Also, Part III discusses
some other possible methods to address this perceived crisis. Finally, Part IV
concludes that South Carolina should not implement a noneconomic damage
cap for medical malpractice claims.
Statutes to cap damages are essentially quick fixes to a much deeper and
more troublesome problem of an overall decline in quality of healthcare in
recent years.3 These statutes have been struck down by many state courts in the

recent years for several constitutional reasons.4 The basic constitutional
argument against such damage limitations is that they violate the Equal
Protection and Due Process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. Also, in some circumstances these laws violate a

3. See HARVEY F. WACHSMAN, M.D., J.D., LETHAL MEDICINE: THE EPIDEMIC OF MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE INAMERICA 173 (Henry Holt & Co. 1993) ("IT]he time has come for all parties
seeking solutions to malpractice problems to recognize that the root cause of the current

malpractice problem is the substantial number of injuries and other adverse results sustained by
patients during the course of hospital and medical treatment.").
4. See, e.g., Ray v. Anesthesia Assoc. of Mobile, 674 So. 2d 525 (Ala. 1995) (holding a
$1,000,000 cap on recovery in medical malpractice action violated the plaintiff's right to access
the courts and equal protection); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991) (holding

a damage limitation of $450,000 unconstitutional as a violation of a right to a trial by jury and
equal protection); Smith v. Dept. of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (holding a $450,000 cap

on noneconomic damages violates a plaintiffs right to access courts for redress of claims); Jones
v. State Bd. of Med., 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976) (remanding for findings of fact pertinent to
constitutional attacks on damage caps but finding a $150,000 cap on recovery was facially
arbitrary), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp., 347 N.E.2d 736
(I11. 1976) (striking down a $500,000 cap on recovery in medical malpractice actions as a
violation of equal protection); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988) (holding
$500,000 cap on recovery as violation of access to the courts and equal protection).
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citizen's fundamental right of access to the courts and the right to ajury trial as
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution and
various state constitutions. Furthermore, the practical effect of these statutes is
contrary to the overall public policy of providing access to qualified healthcare
professionals. Finally, some other methods of addressing this problem will be
discussed with the hope that alternatives will be more effective in attaining the
goal of limiting the amount of damage a negligent physician can cause, rather
than limiting the amount of damages for which a physician can be held liable.
It is for these reasons the South Carolina Legislature should not enact any type
of damage limitations for medical malpractice actions.
II. BACKGROUND

The perceived need for medical malpractice reform began in the mid1970s. It was at this point that medical malpractice insurers first began to notice
losses and as a result many liability carriers left the medical malpractice market.
This resulted in a so-called "crisis of availability" and many state legislatures
passed the first reform measures to ease this crisis.5 Also, many "doctorowned" carriers were founded to provide for the need for medical malpractice
insurance and the crisis temporarily eased.6 Then, in the late 1970s a second
insurance crisis began to emerge. This "crisis of affordability" continued
through the mid-1980s and arguably to the present day.7 The tort reform
movement spawned from this "crisis" produced legislation that was designed
to reduce the possible amount of recovery. A common type of early legislation
simply placed an upper limit or cap on the amount of damages which a medical
malpractice plaintiff could recover.8
Later, more comprehensive reform was enacted that not only cap the
amount of damages, but also link the cap on damages to a party's willingness
to arbitrate the claim.9 These more comprehensive reforms also limit the
amount of noneconomic damages that can be awarded in arbitration to
$250,000.10 It is this Florida system and its constitutional implications that will
be discussed in further detail. Currently, even more progressive reform plans
are being proposed, such as a system of enterprise liability. Under an enterprise
liability system, the responsibility is placed on the organization that provides

5. See M. Roy Schwarz, M.D., Liability Crisis: The Physicians' Viewpoint, in MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE-TORT REFORM 17 (James E. Hamner & B.R. Jennings eds., 1987).

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2001) (illustrating a typical maximum cap of
dam- ages a plaintiff may recover). This cap was originally enacted in 1975.
9. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.209 (2001). This provision was originally enacted in 1988.
10. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.207 (2001).
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healthcare rather than on the individual doctors." While such reforms are on
the horizon, this Comment will analyze the constitutional challenges specific
to statutory caps on damages and the arbitration provisions affecting these caps.
Presently, at least twenty-one states have statutes that cap the amount of
damages a plaintiff may recover in a medical malpractice action. Of these,
thirteen states have placed a cap on only noneconomic damages. But eight
states have placed maximum recovery ceilings into effect that cap both
economic and noneconomic damages. 2 In addition to these state initiatives,
Congress is considering at least two bills that would, amidst other reform, cap
noneconomic damages at $250,000.13 Yet, despite all of the states that have
enacted caps and the pending Congressional legislation, South Carolina has not
enacted any cap on damages in medical malpractice actions. So why urge South
Carolina lawmakers not to enact damage limitations now? Because the "battle"
is on.

14

Presently, two bills are pending before the South Carolina General
Assembly that would cap noneconomic damages at $250,000.'" Also, recent
developments have brought this issue to the forefront of the public and the

media's attention. South Carolina's largest newspaper headlined an article
entitled "Doctors Protesting High Insurance Costs" on January 2, 2003, in
which the author describes doctors in several states organizing and initiating

11. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICEOF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACT OFLEGALREFORMS
ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS 45 (1993).
12. See id. at 81; South Carolina has no such limitation. See also McCullough, Campbell
& Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law, at http://www.mcandl.com/states.html (last
visited Sept. 7, 2003).
13. H.R. 5, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003) (pending in the Senate, passed in the House on March
13th, 2003). This bill is cleverly named the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely
Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003. In addition to the $250,000 cap it would also provide for a
national one year statute of limitations and a three year statute of repose for medical malpractice
claims. H.R. 321, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003) (pending in the House Judiciary Committee and named
the Common Sense Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 2003). Congress considered several bills
last session but did not pass any of these measures. See H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. § 4 (2002). This
bill would not have preempted any state law setting a cap on noneconomic damages, either lower
or higher than the $250,000 cap. See also S. 1370, 107th Cong. § 6 (2001); H.R. 4942, 107th
Cong. § 4 (2002); H.R. 1639, 107th Cong. § 4 (2001).
14. See Tanya Albert, AMA Readies for Battle on Tort Reform, AMEDNEWS.COM (July
8-15, 2002), at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick 02/prl 10708.htm (last visited
Sept. 8, 2003). This online newspaper of the American Medical Association suggests the AMA
is prepared to spend fifteen million dollars lobbying for tort reform this year. This effort is
"calling for legislation at the state and federal levels." Id. Also, the AMA identifies South
Carolina as a "state showing problem signs," so South Carolina is clearly within the AMA's
sights. Id.
15. See S.B. 446, 115th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2003) (pending in the Senate); H.R.
3744, 115th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2003) (pending in the House). These bills are identical
in language.
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"walkouts" and "strikes."' 16 This article was followed up by an article
7
promisingly entitled "S.C. Malpractice Rates Some of Lowest in U.S."
However, the article indicated that while "[m]edical malpractice rates in South
Carolina in 2002 were still among the nation's lowest,... they were about four
times the rates two years earlier."'" Also, the South Carolina Court of Appeals
recently upheld one of the largest medical malpractice verdicts in recent
history. 9 According to Dr. Duren Johnson, President of the South Carolina
Medical Association, his organization is seeking to form a task force and he
20
hopes "to enlist state lawmakers" to address this growing problem. Given
these recent events and the posturing of both the American Medical
Association and the South Carolina Medical Association, the issue seems to be
ripe for debate in South Carolina. 2'
With this in mind, consider one state's statutory damage caps and the
constitutional ramifications of such legislation. In the 1980s the Florida
22
Legislature enacted a comprehensive set of medical malpractice reforms. That
23
these reforms are basically unchanged to the present day. Essentially, these
reforms provide:
In arbitration, noneconomic damages [are] limited to
$250,000 per incident. Economic damages [are] limited to 80
percent of wage loss and loss of earning capacity and medical
expenses, offset by collateral sources. If [a] defendant refuses
to arbitrate, the claim will proceed to trial and there will be no
limit on damages. In addition, if the plaintiff wins at trial, she
will be awarded prejudgment interest and attorney fees up to
25 percent of [the] award. If claimant rejects arbitration,
nonecomomic damages at trial [are] limited to $350,000.
Economic damages [are] limited to 80 percent of wage losses
and medical expenses.24

16. Gavin McCormick, DoctorsProtestingHigh InsuranceCosts, THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Jan. 2, 2003, at Al.

17. Jim Duplessis, S. C MalpracticeRates Some ofLowest in US., THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Jan. 2, 2003, at A6.
18. Id.
19. Burroughs v. Worsham, 352 S.C. 382, 574 S.E.2d 215 (Ct. App. 2002) (upholding a
$3.5 million verdict against doctor for failing to identify and diagnose a patient's colon cancer).
20. Duplessis, supra note 17.
21. Yet, despite all of these developments, the total damages paid in South Carolina in 2002
was $38.9 million, down from $46.2 million in 2001. See, Press Release, Public Citizen, (July 8,
2003) at http://www.citizen.org/documents/SCNPDB.pdf. Such figures cast doubt on the
seriousness of the so-called medical malpractice insurance "crisis" in South Carolina.
22. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.207-766.209 (1988).
23. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.207-766.209 (2001).
24.

OFFICEOF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, IMPACT OF LEGALREFORMS ON

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS

83 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
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For the purposes of constitutional analysis, the most restrictive application of
these statutes' operation must be assumed, i.e., a defendant has conceded
liability and has requested arbitration. In this circumstance, the operation of the
two statutory caps are triggered, capping noneconomic damages at $250,000
if the plaintiff submits to arbitration, or capping noneconomic damages at
$350,000 if the plaintiff rejects voluntary arbitration and proceeds to trial.
Shortly after the Florida Legislature enacted these statutes, parents brought
a challenge on behalf of their minor daughter, who had been treated for a brain
tumor at the University of Miami School of Medicine. As a result of the
School's negligent acts, the young girl's right hand and forearm had to be
amputated. In University ofMiami v. Echarte,2 the intermediate appellate court
affirmed the decision of the trial court and found chapters 766.207 and 766.209
of the Florida Code unconstitutional under the state constitution. The trial court
found that these statutes "violate the Echartes' constitutional rights of access
to the court, rights to trial by jury, equal protection guarantees, and procedural
and substantive due process rights. ' 26 While the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court, it did so on limited grounds, finding that the "statutes
deny claimants the right of access to court." The court expressly declined to
consider the other asserted grounds."
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the appellate court relied heavily
on Smith v. Department of Insurance,2" where the Florida Supreme Court
concluded that an absolute $450,000 cap on noneconomic damages in personal
injury cases violates a citizen's constitutional right to access the courts. In
Smith, the court reasoned that such a restriction on damages is not permissible
unless one of two exceptions is met: "(1) providing a reasonable alternative
remedy or commensurate benefit, or (2) legislative showing of overpowering
public necessity for the abolishment of the right and no alternative method of
meeting such a public necessity."29 Applying this test, the Escharteappellate
court determined that the statutory reforms in question failed "to provide 'a
reasonable alternative to protect the rights of [medical malpractice victims] to
redress for injuries."'"0 The appellate court rejected arguments by the hospital
that this reform provided commensurate benefits similar to the Workers'
Compensation Law and Florida's No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. The
court described these measures as a "reasonable alternative to tort litigation"
providing substantial benefits to those who participate in them.3" The appellate

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
1973)).
30.
31.

585 So. 2d 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 296.
Id.
507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
Id. at 1088 (citing the two exceptions provided in Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1,4 (Fla.
Escharte, 585 So. 2d at 298 (quoting Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4).
Id. at 298-99.
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court also found that more than a "benefit to society in general" is required.
The medical malpractice victim must benefit personally in order to meet this
first exception.3 3 Next, the appellate court found that the statutory scheme did
not meet the second exception because the legislature had not shown "an
overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no
34
alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown. The court
concluded that the legislature had based its findings on "hypothetical
assumptions" and that "[s]uch assumptions provide an uncertain predicate for
''
imposing a cap on noneconomic damages. 3' Therefore, the legislature did not
demonstrate the overpowering public necessity for enacting the statutory caps
on noneconomic damages. For these reasons the Florida Court of Appeals
found these statutes unconstitutional. However, the fight was not over.
Upon appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
36
appellate court and concluded the statutory scheme was constitutional. The
court found that the statutory scheme did provide "a commensurate benefit to
'37
the plaintiff in exchange for the monetary cap." The supreme court found
several benefits afforded to claimants including: 1) a defendant's possible offer
to submit to arbitration which provides the opportunity to recover without the
risk of a civil trial, 2) the quickness of determining whether the defendant has
any defenses with merit, 3) the saved cost of attorney and expert witness fees
needed to otherwise prove liability, 4) the relaxed evidentiary standard for
38
arbitration proceedings, and 5) the prompt payment of damages. By finding
that the statutory scheme provides a commensurate benefit, the court upheld the
statutes. But the court went on to determine that even if the statutory scheme
in question did not afford a commensurate benefit, it met the second prong of
the test in that the legislature had shown an "overpowering public necessity."
The court found that overpowering public necessity in the Task Force FactFinding Report. This Report, citing a dramatic increase in malpractice
39
insurance premiums, was adopted into the preamble of this statutory scheme.
Under the Kluger test, in addition to a finding of an "overpowering public
necessity," the court also must find that "no alternative method" for meeting the
public necessity can be shown.40 Upon further review of the Task Force Report,
the court found that no "less onerous method exists."'" The Echartes disputed
this conclusion:

32. Id. at 299.
33. Id.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 300 (quoting Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4).
Id. at 301.
Univ. of Miami v. Escharte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993).
Id. at 190.
Id. at 194.
See id. at 196.
Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4.
Escharte, 618 So. 2d at 197.
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They point out that the Task Force's findings show that from
1975 to 1986, approximately 4% of all practicing physicians
had two or more claims, but were responsible for 42.2% of
the total amount of paid claims. Thus, the Echartes conclude
that an alternative method to reducing claims would be to
strengthen professional discipline of physicians with
numerous claims.42
The court even conceded that "[t]he reduction of the frequency and severity of
malpractice would certainly diminish the amount of loss payments and
subsequently medical malpractice rates."43 But the court found there was no
"less onerous alternative or less onerous method of meeting the crisis" and thus
upheld the statutory scheme."
Two justices, including the chief justice, filed adamant dissenting
opinions.4 5 Chief Justice Barkett argued that this statutory scheme not only
violated the claimant's right to access the courts, but also infringed on a right
to a trial by jury and the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Florida and
United States Constitutions." Relying on the reasoning from Smith v.
DepartmentofInsurance,4 7 she noted that the constitutional guarantee of access
to the courts must be read in conjunction with the right to a jury trial:
Access to courts is granted for the purpose of redressing
injuries. A plaintiff who receives a jury verdict for, e.g.,
$1,000,000, has not received a constitutional redress of
injuries if the Legislature statutorily, and arbitrarily, caps the
recovery at $450,000. Nor, we add, because the jury verdict
is being arbitrarily capped, is the plaintiff receiving the
constitutional benefit of a jury trial as we have heretofore
understood that right."
Additionally, Chief Justice Barkett found this statutory scheme to violate equal
protection guarantees "by creating two classes of medical malpractice victims,
those with serious injuries whose recovery is limited by the caps and those with
minor injuries who receive full compensation."49 She questioned how singling
out victims with the most serious injuries and allowing them less than full
42. Id. (internal citation omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 198, 199.
46. Id. at 198 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
47. 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
48. Escharte, 618 So. 2d at 198 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Smith, 507 So. 2d at
1088-89).
49. Id.
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recovery bears any relationship to the goal of ending the crisis in medical
malpractice liability.5" Finally, she concluded by reasoning "I cannot find that
'no alternative method' has been shown," and thus the scheme failed the second
prong of the Kluger test.5 So which side got it right?
III. DISCUSSION
The trial court and the two dissenting justices in the Florida Supreme Court
demonstrated the proper constitutional reasoning under the state and federal
constitutions. The majority opinion by the Florida Supreme Court ignores the
longstanding principle, recognized by both Florida precedent as well as other
states, of an individual's right to fully recover for those injuries inflicted by
negligent defendants. First and foremost, this statutory scheme violates a
claimant's right of access to the courts guaranteed by Article I, section 21 of the
Florida Constitution, and the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Florida law clearly allows derogations of this right only if one of two
that
exceptions has been met. 52 The contention by the Florida Supreme Court
53 suffice
scheme
statutory
this
under
the minimal benefits afforded to claimants
to allow for the derogation of the fundamental right to access to the courts is
without merit. While this system affords "a commensurate benefit" to a
claimant with lesser injuries, it fails to provide for, and in fact punishes, those
unfortunate claimants whose noneconomic damages far exceed $350,000. As
noted by the appellate court, the benefits afforded to claimants under the
Workers Compensation Law and the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act are
substantial. Under the former, injured workers can recover damages without
having to endure the delay and burden of proving fault in tort litigation. Under
the latter, those who maintain the required insurance are entitled to prompt
held liable
recovery for their own economic loss and are protected from being
5 4 By contrast,
accident.
the
to
for noneconomic damages suffered by parties
under the Florida scheme, a grossly negligent defendant can limit a claimant's
damages by submitting to arbitration. As one dissenter points out, this is a
classic case of "heads I win, tails you lose" because the benefit only inures to
the defendant." As such, this systemprovides for no real commensurate benefit
to claimants and fails the first prong of the Kluger test.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 199.
52. See Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1088.
53. See Escharte, 618 So. 2d at 194 (listing the benefits of Florida's damage limitation

scheme).
54. See Escharte, 585 So. 2d at 298-99.
55. Escharte, 618 So. 2d at 200 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court's contention that this scheme
meets the second exception of the Kluger test is also without merit. While the
Task Force Report did show rising malpractice insurance rates of a critical
nature, which may qualify as an overwhelming public necessity, the report also
indicated that vigorous professional management of medical malpractice could
also curtail the crisis. Remember, the legislature has the burden of showing that
no alternative method to meet the public necessity exists. 6 Despite this burden
of proof, the Eschartes offered a portion of the Task Force report that indicated
the rising liability crisis could be curtailed by tight disciplinary control over
physicians." Some reports estimate that at least five percent of the nation's
doctors are considered unfit to practice.5 8 Logically, it would follow that strict
disciplinary oversight of these reckless few would curtail a crisis. Nonetheless,
the Eschartes majority upheld this legislation by utilizing the wrong test. The
majority concluded there was no "less onerous alternative." Instead, the court
should have required the state to prove that "no alterative method" existed. The
court's conclusion failed to recognize the policy behind the second prong ofthe
test--only allowing the derogation of claimant's fundamental rights as a last
resort. Because this scheme fails to meet either of the two exceptions of the
Kluger test, it violates Article I, section 21 of the Florida State Constitution.
In addition to violating a claimant's right to the courts, the statutory scheme
also denies claimants with serious debilitating injuries equal protection under
the law.5 9 As Chief Justice Barkett highlighted, such an arbitrary cap creates
two classes of victims: "those with serious injuries whose recovery is limited
by the caps and those with minor injuries who receive full compensation."60
This is contrary to longstanding Florida law that "similarly situated persons are
equal under the law and must be treated alike," because only the most seriously
injured persons, with damages in excess of the cap, would bear the burden of
reducing the overall cost.6 Fundamental to constitutional validity is the notion
that "[s]tatutory classifications must bear some reasonable relationship to a
permissive legislative objective and not be discriminatory, arbitrary, or
oppressive." 2 Chapter 766.207(7)(b) of the Florida Code seeks to limit
noneconomic damages to a maximum of $250,000 in arbitration and provides
that such damages shall be made proportional to the claimant's capacity to
enjoy life.6 3 A claimant with fifty percent reduction in capacity to enjoy life
would be awarded only $125,000 pursuant to this provision. Therefore, in order

56.
57.
58.
59.

See Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1088.
See Escharte, 618 So. 2d at 197.
See WACHSMAN, supra note 3, at 7.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.

60. Escharte, 618 So. 2d at 198 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.207(7)(b) (2001).
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to collect a mere $250,000 in noneconomic damages a claimant must have
absolutely no capacity to enjoy life. Such provisions are not only oppressive
and arbitrary, but are an outrageous derogation of a plaintiff s right to recover
fully for his injuries. The Florida legislature has arbitrarily chosen to draw a
line at $250,000 so that any claimant with lesser injuries may recover fully, but
any claimant with greater injury may only recover partially. Such legislation is
inherently arbitrary in making such a distinction. Some courts have concluded
64
that this line drawing creates a facially discriminatory classification. Another
court stated that "[i]t is simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden
of supporting the medical care industry solely upon those persons who are the
6
most severely injured and therefore most in need of compensation." The
singling out of the most seriously injured claimants to bear the burden of
reducing the overall liability crisis is a violation of Equal Protection provisions
of both the Florida and the United States Constitutions.
Damage limitation reforms setting a maximum amount of recovery likely
have severe constitutional problems under South Carolina law. Article I, section
14 of the South Carolina Constitution provides "[tihe right to a trial by jury
66
shall be preserved inviolate. In construing this provision the Supreme Court
of South Carolina has declared there is "no question as to the legal right of [a]
plaintiff, in [an] action in tort for unliquidated damages, to have the amount of
67
damages properly determined by a jury., Also, Article I, section 3 of the
South Carolina Constitution provides "[t]he privileges and immunities of
citizens of this state ... shall not be abridged, nor shall any person be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
'68
denied the equal protection of the laws. Further, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina has vigorously enforced the guarantee of equal protection where the
legislature has drawn seemingly arbitrary lines between otherwise similarly
situated persons. 69 As such, it appears that under South Carolina law these

64. See Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 555 P.2d 399, 411 (Idaho 1976) (describing a
classification based on the degree of injury and damage suffered as discriminatory on its face).
65. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. 1988).
66. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 14.

67. Hatchell v. McCracken, 243 S.C. 45, 51, 132 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1963).
68. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3 (merging the due process and equal protection guarantees into
one clause).
69. See Hanvey v. Oconee Mem'l Hosp., 308 S.C. 1, 416 S.E.2d 623 (1992) (finding a

statute that limited the liability of charitable hospitals to $100,000 violated equal protection where
another statute limited the liability of all other charitable organizations to $200,000, because there
was no rational basis for this distinction); Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978)

(finding a comparative negligence statute that applies only to motor vehicle accidents
constitutionally defective because there was no rational justification for singling out persons
injured in automobile accidents as different from all others injured in negligence torts); Broom
v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978) (holding that a statute of repose violated equal
protection where no rational basis appeared for making distinction between architects, engineers,
and contractors on one hand, and owners and manufacturers on the other, when granting the
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reforms would present the same constitutional problems highlighted by the
Florida courts, namely, that these damage caps violate a plaintiffs constitutional rights to a jury trial, due process of law, and equal protection under the
law.
The prospect of a federal cap on the amount of damages recoverable in
medical malpractice actions is uncertain. While the reform is speculative, its
passage would have constitutional implications. It seems highly unlikely that
the United States Supreme Court would strike down any national reform
because, absent special circumstances, the lowest level of scrutiny is applied to
this kind of tort reform.7" The review of such legislation under the Due Process
Clause is limited only to whether the legislature has been "arbitrary or
irrational" in enacting the statute. 7' Additionally, the Court does not pry into the
wisdom of legislation and only requires a "reasonable basis for passing the
statute.''72 The review is essentially the same under the Equal Protection
Clause. 73 Absent a suspect classification the rule is:
[W]here individuals in the group affected by a law have
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State
has the authority to implement, the courts have been very
reluctant ...

to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to

whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be
pursued. In such cases, the Equal Protection clause requires
only a rational means to serve a legitimate end.74
Upon comparison, it is clear that state constitutional provisions are much more
restrictive in this area of the law than the United States Constitution.
However, at least two arguments could still be made that national damages
caps are unconstitutional. First, there is a plausible argument that Congress
does not have the authority under our Constitution to enact these limitations and
that this subject is more properly addressed by state legislatures. Congress will
attempt to base its authority in the Commerce Clause of Article I, section 8."
The United States Supreme Court has typically construed the power given to

former immunity from suit after ten years for negligence to the improvement of real property).
70. See OFFICEOF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, IMPACT OF LEGALREFORMS
ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS 99 (1993).

71. See id.(referencing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59
(1978)). Of course, it could be argued that drawing a line at $250,000 is inherently arbitrary.
72. Id.
73. See id..
74. City of Clebume v. Texas, 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985).
75. See H.R. 5, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss1/9

12

Padget: Damage Limitations
in Medical Malpractice
Actions: Necessary Legi
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
2003)

Congress under the Commerce Clause broadly.76 However, recently the
Supreme Court has narrowed its view of the power conferred on Congress by
the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the Court invalidated legislation based on
the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez77 and United States v.
Morrison.78 Given these recent decisions, it is unclear whether the Supreme
Court would invalidate federal legislation implementing damages caps in
medical malpractice actions.
A second constitutional problem with national reform may be constitutional
challenges based on the Tenth Amendment. Although the United States
Constitution is the "supreme law of the land,"79 the Tenth Amendment may

suggest that the right to address the perceived medical malpractice crisis has
been reserved to the states. However, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan

TransitAuthority,80 the Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to
state agencies despite the Tenth Amendment and the fact that states
traditionally regulated these areas. 8 Thus, this argument is not likely to
succeed, and any such national cap will likely be upheld.
Aside from the constitutional reasons, states should not enact damage
limitations statutes because these statutes have undesirable practical effects.82
Statutory schemes such as the Florida scheme discussed previously allow
negligent physicians and their insurance carriers to escape from complete
liability. This is contrary to a fundamental purpose of tort law, which is to
encourage the avoidance of injury by the imposition of complete liability.83 The
result is substandard healthcare, allowing careless physicians and healthcare
providers to inflict more injury than if they had been held completely liable for
their negligent acts. Generally, the goal of healthcare reform is to provide
adequate access to the healthcare system to all members of society.84 Rather,
the goal should be to provide access to adequate and competent healthcare to

76. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the application of a
federal production quota, founded on the Interstate Commerce Clause, to a farmer who grew only
a small crop of winter wheat intended primarily for his personal consumption).

77. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating a federal statute prohibiting the possession of a gun
in the vicinity of a schoolyard).

78. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating a provision of the Violence Against Women Act that
permitted the victims of gender-motivated violence to sue their attackers in federal court).

79. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
80. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

81. Id.
82. In fact, many studies show that damage caps will not lower insurance costs for doctors.
Dr. G. Richard Thompson, a Professor of Economics at Clemson University who recently
conducted a study examining the effect of damage caps, has concluded that "if you look at states
that have capped malpractice awards, insurance premiums continue to go up." Paul Wachter, S. C.
Group Seeks Caps on Awards, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), July 6, 2003 at A4.
83. See GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & JAMES E. MEEKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF

TORTS 5 (2d ed. 1983).
84. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 766.201 (2002) (summarizing the intent of the legislature).
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all members of society.
It seems that some kind of reform may be needed, but how can this be done
without infringing on citizens' constitutional rights? One alternative is stricter
discipline from within the medical profession. As pointed out in the Task Force
Report in Escharte, a large percentage of injuries are produced by a relatively
small number of doctors.8 5 While this correlation can be partly explained by the
fact that some doctors practice in high-risk fields, it is indisputable that some
of this correlation is due to a number of substandard physicians and healthcare
providers.86 A recent government report released in July 2003 found that 3.9%
of South Carolina doctors represented 61% of the state's malpractice payouts
between 1990 and 2002.87 This report also found that of the ninety-four doctors
involved in three or more malpractice payouts, only fourteen have been
disciplined.8" Because so few doctors cause a great portion of the malpractice
awards, it is reasonable to conclude that more stringent regulation from within
the profession would directly target the source of the problem and effectively
reduce the overall amount of liability-without infringing on citizens'
constitutional rights.
Additionally, even if caps are indispensable to reduce the amount of
liability, there are better methods of implementation than that which the Florida
Legislature has chosen-methods that would not infringe on claimants'
constitutional rights by providing for flexibility. A flexible statutory cap would
operate to limit lesser claims to promote stability in the system, yet give judges
discretion to exceed the cap in flagrant and extreme cases.8 9 Also, a state statute
controlling excessive awards by providingjudicial guidelines for implementing
remittitur or ordering a new trial in circumstances where damages are blatantly
excessive could curtail the liability crisis. These types of statutes have been
held constitutional.90 Another possible method of reform would be a statute
designed to reduce all medical malpractice awards by a reasonable percentage.
For example, at the conclusion of the trial in which the jury has chosen to
award the victim $100,000, the court would reduce the verdict by, for example,

85. See Univ. Of Miami v. Escharte, 618 So. 2d 189, 197 (Fla. 1993).
86. See WACHSMAN, supra note 3, at 7. In his book, Dr. Wachsman, who holds both an
M.D. and a J.D., estimates that "at least 5 percent of the nation's doctors are considered by
medical authorities to be unfit to practice" and that "[t]hese physicians may account for tens of
thousands of needless injuries and deaths each year because of unnecessary operations, botched
procedures, faulty drug prescriptions, and inept diagnoses and treatments." Id.

87. Press Release, Public Citizen (July 8, 2003) at http://www.citizen.org/documents/SC_
NPDB.pdf.

88. Id.
89. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (2002) (providing for exceptions when
plaintiff can show "special circumstances in the case which warrant a finding that imposition of
such a limitation would deprive the plaintiff of just compensation for the injuries sustained").
90. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (upholding a N.Y.
statute under the Seventh Amendment where statute provided for new trial after excessive jury
award).
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ten percent, and render a final judgment of $90,000 for the victim. While such
a statute might be subject to the Due Process and jury trial constitutional
problems discussed above, at least it would treat all victims equally under the
law. Finally, inaction is better than the unconstitutional method of reform
exemplified by the Florida statutory scheme. These rigid statutory caps violate
the right to access the courts and the right to equal protection of those victims
of serious incidents of medical malpractice. These limitations should not be
enacted by the South Carolina Legislature, and if so enacted, should not be
upheld by South Carolina courts.
IV. CONCLUSION

This is a world of compensations, and victims of medical malpractice
should be completely compensated for their losses. State medical malpractice
reforms that cap the amount of damages a victim may recover encounter several
constitutional problems. Florida's statutory scheme of damage limitation
violates not only a seriously injured victim's right to be treated equally under
the law and right to complete compensation, but also restricts a claimant's
fundamental right to access the courts for redress of injuries. In addition to the
serious constitutional implications of these damage limitations, these statutes
also have a negative practical effect on the quality of healthcare. Because there
are other legislative alternatives that do not infringe on citizens' constitutional
rights, such as stricter intra-discipline regulation of physicians, damage
limitations should be a last resort. Meanwhile, states such as South Carolina
that have no statutory caps on damages should not implement these
questionable reforms, and courts should strike these caps down if such reforms
are enacted.

William R. Padget
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